Trump, Venezuela and International Law

In January 2026, Donald Trump ordered the US military to capture Nicolas Maduro, the President of Venezuela, and his wife Cilia Flores and bring them to the US for a criminal trial for drug related offenses. This involved attacks on several sites in the country, cutting the electricity in Caracas and the targeting of several locations by US special forces.¹

Trump justified his actions by claiming Maduro allowed two groups to increase the influx of drugs into the US and designated both as Foreign Terrorist Organisations.² Trump claimed Maduro emptied the prison and ‘insane asylums’ and sent the people formerly detained there to the US.² As a result, Trump claimed operation was to allow law enforcement to arrest Maduro and Flores for drug trafficking with the aim of putting both on trial in the US.²

As for the legal justification, Trump claimed this was within his article 2 authority under the US constitution and was the product of the international the right of self defence.³ In doing so he invoked one of the exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.⁴

Since the attack on Venezuela, there has been a lot of discussion about the value of the prohibition of using force in international law. Particularly in an era when Israel has blatantly violated this rule by committing genocide in Gaza,⁵ and the US has continued to violate this norm by bombing half a dozen sovereign nations in 2025 alone.⁶

However the meaning of this rule of international law has been in question long before January 2026. And much of the reason for this lies in US actions, particularly post 9/11. These actions have led to a weakening of the prohibition over time. Without understanding the history of the US actions, the true implications of Trump’s actions on this rule of international law cannot be understood.

What is the right of self defence in international law?

Article 51 states: ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security’.⁴

There are a number of conditions which must be present for a states claim to be acting in self-defence to be legitimate. These conditions are taken from the UN Charter or the customs of international law. Particularly after 9/11, the meaning of many of the conditions has been increasingly subject to be dispute, thereby expanding the the circumstances in which states claim legal justification in Article 51 for their use of armed force.

Requirements for Article 51 to apply:

An Armed attack must have occured:

Article 51 opens with the phrase ‘if an armed attack occurs’⁴ indicating that an armed attack is a required for the right of self-defence to apply. An armed attack was defined by the ICJ as ‘the most grave forms of the use of force’ and contrasted them with less grave uses of force.⁷ The main factors that determine whether a use of force is an armed attack is the scale and effect of the attack in question.⁷

What has begun to be disputed in recent times, is whether anticipation of such an attack is sufficient for invoking Article 51. For example, Quigley highlighted the invasion of Afghanistan was justified to the UNSC on the basis that there was an ongoing threat by Al-Qaeda who was operating in Afghanistan.⁸. Similar claims were made in the lead up to the Iraq war despite the US abandoning this justification in favour of one rooted in a UNSC resolution instead.⁹

The origin of these arguments pre-dates 1945. Some states have argued the right existed prior to 1945 and continued to do so after 1945. However, there is a problem with that argument: during the drafting of the UN charter, no state argued pre-emptive self defence would be permissible under the UN charter and article 51 narrowly refers to a armed attack rather than the broader concept of a use of force or threat of use of force which is the language used in Article 2(4).¹⁰ In addition, very few states have attempted to assert the existence of this right after 1945 so as Ghafur argues it is unlikely that pre-emptive self defence is a custom of international law.⁹

Self defence must only be exercised against the responsible party:

In several ICJ cases, the court ruled that without attribution to a state party, a right of self defence cannot be exercised against that party.¹¹ This is because without atrbution there is no way of knowing if that state are actually responsible for the original armed attack that is being responded to.

This requirement appears missing with regard to the invasion of Afghanistan because as Quigley argues, harboring Al Qaeda does not mean that Afghanistan organised and encouraged the 9/11 attacks.⁸ Furthermore Israel claimed in an case about the wall built in occupied Palestinian territory, that resolutions passed by the UN security Council recognised right of self-defence against terrorist attacks but the ICJ rejected their self defence claim because they did not claim the attacks were organised or encouraged by a state.¹²

Self defence must be necessary, proportionate and exercised against a legitimate target:

Necessity required all other potential alternatives to use of force to be futile.¹³ The ICJ highlighted the lack of US complaint of military activity on a oil platform operated by Iran before it was destroyed, as indicative of a lack of necessity because peaceful means were still available to the US, namely a complaint, at the time they attacked the oil platform.¹³ Quigley highlights that a similar situation occurred prior to the post 9/11 invasion of Afghanistan .⁸

Proportionality requires any act of self-defence must be proportionate to the initial armed attack.¹³ If an act of self-defence is not proportional, it may take on a punitive character and become a reprisal which in non-war circumstances is unlawful.¹⁴ However, issues with regard to proportionality of acts taken in self defence have always existed and are not unique to US actions.

Any targeting of persons or places that are protected remains unlawful even when a lawful right of self defence exists.¹⁵ For example, targeting civilians, such as what the US has done in the Caribbean in the last year when bombing boats that it claims are involved in drug trafficking,¹⁶ would be unlawful even if it was lawful to use force due to an influx of drugs, because even if all persons on the boats were drug traffickers they are still civilians.

Can the US attack on Venezuela be justified as self defence?

Before discussing this its important to emphasies one thing: there is no evidence that the people who are immigrating to the US from Venezuela are dangerous criminals or from ‘insane asylums’ nor are they a threat to US national security. They are people with rights to take refuge under international law and any claim otherwise is frankly an attempt to misrepresent the history of immigration from Latin America to the US for political purposes. That is beyond the scope of this blog post but for an in depth discussion as to why people didn’t come to the US ’the legal way’ please see this video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDbtrdfYqBc.

To answer the question, no. The attack on Venezuela is not self-defence. Here’s why:

1- Drug importation or sending ‘dangerous’ persons to immigrate to the US are not armed attacks because they meet neither the scale nor effect requirements for an armed attack. They are, according to the best possible interpretation for the Trump administration, a law enforcement and or immigration law issue. Neither involve the use of force by Venezuela let alone a use of force of a grave enough nature to be an armed attack.

2- Even if the Trump administration was anticipating a imminent rise in the degree of the so called increase in ‘dangerous’ migrants or increase in drug influx, even then neither can be described as a use of force.

It is also important to point out there is little evidence or drugs entering the US coming from Venezuela.¹⁷ and migrants traveling to the US are just people seeking a better life for their families.

3- In the ICJ case referenced above, the US couldn’t prove the attacks on their ships were committed by Iran as they could have been committed by Iraq, therefore it was not lawful for them to target an Iranian oil platform in self defence because they could not prove Iran was the responsible part for the initial armed attack.

Even if migration and drugs could be an armed attack, there’s no evidence that Venezuela is supporting either so without attribution, its not lawful for exercise self defence against them. Based on the wall opinion of the ICJ, its likely not legal to target locations in the country based on association with these activities either, without attribution to the state of Venezuela itself

4- There are peaceful means available to Trump to deal with drugs entering the US and peaceful means of processing immigrants to the US. Therefore the attacks are not necessary.

5- The use of force that cuts of electricity to the whole of Caracas and killing dozens of people cannot be proportionate to drugs entering the US and as mentioned above, people migrating to the US is not an armed attack, they are refugees so its not proportionate to respond to their entry into the US with any kind of armed force.

6- Cutting of electricity to the capitol city Caracas has an effect on all persons there not just those whom may be legitimate targets. Also civilians died in the attacks alongside members of Maduro’s guards,¹⁸ and they are protected persons under international law.

So in conclusion: none of the requirements for self defence under Article 51 exists therefore the US did not have a right of self defence.

But you knew that, its in introduction to this post. So now the meaning of self defence in international law has been explained, lets get to the point of this post.

The Point:

As you can see from the discussion of the requirements of self defence under Article 51, each requirement has a certain amount of ambiguity associated with it. Much of that ambiguity is tied to US actions, often after 9/11 but sometimes before. Trump even sought to justify his attack on Venezuela by reference to George H W Bush’s attack on Panama, which pre-dates 9/11.

But that ambiguity cannot be exploited by all nations equally, it is easier for powerful nations like the US to exploit it. What follows is an example of the role of power asymmetry in this exploitation.

The unwilling or unable doctrine:

Following 9/11 a doctrine called the unable or unwilling doctrine was developed. It argues when a state is unable or unwilling to respond to a threat emanating from its territory, another state can respond to that threat via its right of self defence. This is because the ICJ ruled in a case in 1949 that a States must not knowingly allow their territory to be used to violate the rights of another state.¹⁹ Therefore where a state violates this principle, as some argued Afghanistan did after 9/11, the victim state can respond and the question of state attribution governs whether its lawful to target the state itself or just the location of the threat within its territory.²⁰

Such claims are dubious, as the ICJ ruled that without the consent of the so called unwilling/ unable state, such attacks would be unlawful.¹¹. Despite this, the ideas at the core of this doctrine have become widespread. The doctrine allows for the creation of responsibility for armed attacks where none exists, either because the state did not knowingly allow their territory to be used to violate another nations rights or they could not stop such violations from occurring. Trump exploited that by claiming the mere existence of the ’threats’ from the country combined with a government who will not meet his demands to address the ’threats’ makes the government and Maduro in particular responsible for those threats. This dynamic can clearly be seen in the timeline of events leading up to the attack on Venezuela.²¹

Dawood Ahmed in ‘Defending Weak States against the Unwilling or Unable Doctrine of Self-Defence’ clearly articulates the damage done by this doctrine.²² Namely, the unwilling or unable doctrine is ambiguous therefore it can be difficult to determine if a state is in violation.²² If it is difficult to establish whether a violation exists, it can be difficult to establish whether the doctrine applies therefore self defence cannot be permissible. Weak states are naturally less able to hold states accountable for violations of their rights as a result of self-defence being exercised against them, justified via the so-called doctrine.²² More powerful states are better able to take advantage of the possible existence of this doctrine.²²

While Ahmed’s argument focuses on the unwilling or unable doctrine, it can apply to any exploitation of the ambiguity as to meaning of the requirements for the right of self defence to be invoked. The US often exploits not just the doctrine, but the general ambiguity of the requirements of self defence.

Most of the examples given above include US actions or that of her allies. The US helped introduce this ambiguity into global discourse about the meaning of a states right to self defence. Weaker states are unable to respond to the US taking advantage those ambiguities, just as Ahmed argues, they are unable to respond to more powerful states, including the US, using the unwilling or unable doctrine.²²

The US has significant but not sole responsibility for this state of affairs. The Russians have not been shy falsely invoking self-defence during their invasions of Ukraine to give the most recent example. The unwilling or unable doctrine wouldn’t exist without the bending of requirements the of the right of self defence to the maximum. Powerful nations continue to exploit weaker nations by invoking ambiguities they helped to introduce into the law of self defence, knowing weaker nations are incapable of responding in any way that would lead to consequences for them.

This dynamic has long existed in international law, and is one of the reasons why despite the clarity of many international legal obligations, including what right of self defence, states are still able to violate it. This dyamic is a key reason for the failure in enforcing international law. Which makes powerful states like the US invoking that as a failure of international law itself, more than a little ironic.